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Analyticity (New Problems of Philosophy), by Cory Juhl, Eric Loomis
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Analyticity, or the 'analytic/synthetic' distinction is one of the most important and controversial problems in contemporary philosophy. It is also essential to understanding many developments in logic, philosophy of language, epistemology and metaphysics. In this outstanding introduction to analyticity Cory Juhl and Eric Loomis cover the following key topics:
- The origins of analyticity in the philosophy of Hume and Kant
- Carnap's arguments concerning analyticity in the early twentieth century
- Quine's famous objections to analyticity in his classic 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' essay
- The relationship between analyticity and central issues in metaphysics, such as ontology
- The relationship between analyticity and epistemology
- Analyticity in the context of the current debates in philosophy, including mathematics and ontology
Throughout the book the authors show how many philosophical controversies hinge on the problem of analyticity. Additional features include chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary of technical terms making the book ideal to those coming to the problem for the first time.
- Sales Rank: #2685731 in Books
- Published on: 2009-09-11
- Released on: 2009-08-07
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Dimensions: 9.21" h x .76" w x 6.14" l, 1.15 pounds
- Binding: Paperback
- 336 pages
Review
'Juhl and Loomis have provided an interesting and engaging introduction to the problem of distinguishing analytic from synthetic sentences. They do an admirable job of explaining the importance of this distinction by tracing its history from Hume to Kant to the logical positivists and, in the last few chapters, to debates which are at the center of contemporary analytic philosophy.' – Jeff Speaks, University of Notre Dame, USA
'This is a great book, and certainly the best introduction to the history of analytic/synthetic distinction out there. Juhl and Loomis trace the distinction through the work of Kant, Bolzano and Frege, before paying special attention the development of Quine and Carnap's views, and presenting and defending their own account of analyticity.' - Gillian Russell, Washington University, St Louis, USA
About the Author
Cory Juhl, University of Texas, Austin, USA Eric Loomis, University of South Alabama, USA
Most helpful customer reviews
0 of 0 people found the following review helpful.
Musings on a classification algorithm
By Dr. Lee D. Carlson
Texts and monographs in philosophy can be difficult to read and understand not because of the complexity of their contents but rather because of the context in which they are presented. This context is set by the historical background and problem sets which the texts were written to address. If readers of these texts do not have a knowledge of this history they may not be able to appreciate the sometimes lengthy argumentation that can be found in them. With few exceptions, authors of philosophical texts assume that their readers have such a background, and therefore do not bother to motivate the subject matter at hand. Readers who have a sincere desire to understand certain trends in philosophical thought but who are time-constrained may therefore by stymied in their efforts because of this lack of historical motivation.
This book is an exception because it does offer such a motivation. The authors could have restricted their discussion to their solution of the problem of analyticity that they outline in the last chapter of the book, with the assumption that readers have the background to understand the solution. Instead, they dramatically improve the didactic quality of the book by discussing how the problem of analyticity arose and why it was (and is) deemed important by a large number of professional philosophers. Even if readers disagree with some of the details of the presentation and the proposed solution, they can still walk away with a better appreciation of the subject matter. The reviewer therefore found the clarity of the writing exceptional and therefore this review will concentrate on the details of the problem of the analytic-synthetic distinction as brought out in the book.
At least for the reviewer, what immediately comes to mind is that the problem of the analytic-synthetic distinction can be reduced to that of a classification algorithm, similar to algorithms that are very prevalent in the field of machine learning and mathematical linguistics. This is especially true for the elaborations of the analytic-synthetic distinction due to David Hume and Immanuel Kant. The issue from this standpoint is therefore of finding a methodology/algorithm that will successfully demarcate analytic statements from synthetic ones. One can straightforwardly apply this conception as one progresses through the book. It is of course not the intent or belief of the authors or of professional philosophers that the problem of the analytic-synthetic distinction be viewed as a problem in classification theory in machine learning/mathematical linguistics, but all through the book the dialog is dominated by the need to classify statements according to some specialized criteria.
From the standpoint of elementary mathematics it is also important to note how naive some philosophers are when it comes to simple arithmetic. For example, it is brought out in the book how Immanuel Kant accepted the analyticity of some statements like for example 7 + 5 = 12, forgetting that even in his time it was perfectly acceptable to conclude that 7 + 5 can also be 0, if one views this from the vantage point of telling time (clock arithmetic: 7 + 5 = 0 (mod 12), 12 + 12 = 12 (mod 12), and so on). Kant may have therefore exhibited more scrutiny in dealing with the supposed analyticity of arithmetic statements such as these by a mere reflection on the telling of time. A more contemporary inquirer with a broader knowledge of mathematics may conclude that mathematical statements should in fact be classified as more synthetic rather than analytic, due the context dependence of mathematical statements (modular arithmetic being one of many examples in this regard). In other words, mathematical statements are not as “analytic” as Kant thought since one must always check in which context the statements are being made. The statement 7 + 5 = 12 is certainly true in the context of the integers but it is also true that 7 + 5 = 0 in the context of the integers modulo 12. In addition, Kant and those using this example to discuss analyticity assume that such statements are made in non-noisy environments where pure communication is possible. But over a noisy radio channel for example a radio receiver may receive the statement 7 + 5 = 1, with the “2” in the 12 being corrupted by the noise. Only after error correction is performed at the receiver to recover 7 + 5 = 12 will argumentation about its analyticity arise again.
The reviewer is always struck not only from a study of this book but that of others as to the degree that the Godel incompleteness theorems are viewed as “devastating” for the foundations of mathematics. It is certainly true that the construction of true sentences that are not provable in a formal system is based on rigorous argumentation and therefore should be accepted. However one can easily view such statements as “outliers” because they normally do not arise in the construction of mathematical concepts and theories. In addition, the Godel incompleteness theorems arise in a context that is strictly formal, and this context bears no resemblance to the informal methods and use of ordinary language that characterize the construction of proofs in modern mathematical practice. Indeed, it would be extremely difficult to reduce for example the proof of Fermat’s last theorem to a collection of formal statements of the kind that you find in the context of the incompleteness theorems. The field of automated theorem proving for example has been stymied by the difficulty in modeling the way in which mathematicians construct proofs, which is definitely not formal, and makes heavy use of ordinary language, which itself has also defied formalization. Also, the methodology of science has never been reduced to a formal system to the best knowledge of the reviewer. Such a reduction would make the field of automated scientific discovery a more viable and powerful one. The authors do a good job however of explaining how the Godel results were instrumental in moving Carnap away from his contention of a universal logic that forms the foundation of all of science and mathematics. But here again, Carnap could have argued that the Godel statements are outliers that could be excised from the formal system of interest, with not much harm done, other than perhaps diminishing one’s emotional confidence in formal systems.
Maybe if philosophers would actually work in a scientific laboratory they would appreciate more what the subject of experimental science is all about and thus be able to write about the foundations and philosophy of science more effectively. In the discussion of Carnap’s P-rules in this book, an example of the gas law is given wherein a conclusion is drawn that the volume of a gas will decrease to a certain value depending on given changes in temperature and pressure. Not observing that value is considered to be a counterexample to the Carnap P-rules, but no discussion at all is delegated to the ever present measurement error that accompanies actual experiments. The value predicted (taken to be 2500 cc in the example discussed) is different from that observed (taken to be 2300 cc). But the equipment used in making measurements of volume may not be fine enough to distinguish these numbers. The possibility of “mistaken observations” is briefly referred to in the discussion along with the need for testing the equipment to make sure it is working properly, and thus one could perhaps extend the Carnap P-rules, but this is not discussed in the book, and in fact is usually omitted entirely in discussions of philosophy of science (Karl Popper being a notable exception in this regard). Not only that making sure equipment is “working properly” addresses primarily the occurrence of systematic error in experiments.
The assertion of the reviewer that discussions on analyticity can be reduced to a search for a classification algorithm is brought out in the authors’ discussion of Carnap’s shift to a semantic approach to the problem, wherein the “analytic truths” of a language were to be identified on a case-by-case basis. This would involve enumerating these cases, or the language rules that enabled construction of analytic sentences. Also, the authors speak of Carnap’s need to distinguish between analytic statements for formulating rules of a language and “synthetic” statements which have a truth value that arises from “extra-linguistic matters of fact”. Such a classification would be language dependent of course, but nevertheless amenable to modern symbolic programming languages that are designed explicitly to deal with textual processing and the consequent classification of grammatical constructions. Whether such algorithms are part of Carnap’s notion of philosophical activity as “language engineering” (as the authors refer to it) is perhaps speculative however, and will probably be rejected as being too “pragmatic”. Pragmatism is considered by many philosophers to be a sign that one has given up on philosophy, in that appeals to common sense are sometimes made, and this is considered to be an abomination to the entire philosophical enterprise. Carnap aggravated things even more by his insistence that metaphysical conceptions be eliminated entirely from language, in order to uncover the meaningful ones of science, and in using “expediency and fruitfulness” to adopt certain linguistic frameworks. Willard Quine too, whose reaction to Carnap is developed in detail in the book, could also be considered by many philosophers to have retreated into what some philosophers have called “vulgar pragmatism” because of his “radical naturalism”. As the authors discuss, Quine wanted to embed the results of empirical science into philosophy itself, believing that such an embedding would bring out the “best theory of the world”.
Much space, in fact most of the book, is devoted to the Quinean objections to analyticity , but the authors thankfully do not want their book to be merely an historical overview. The last chapter is devoted to giving a “positive account” to the discussion of analyticity that is not simply a collection of refutations of the notion of analyticity. Some virtues of their discussion include the fact that they are not hesitant to use terms such as “implausible”, and “outweighed” to answer objections and to use analogies to illustrate some of the main points of their solution. One part of their discussion that could stand a little more illumination is when they discussion the notion of a French bachelor or “frenchelor” that they have used in various parts of the book. Such a contraction is very meaningful from the standpoint of information compression in information networks because of the savings in bandwidth. Hence the term “frenchelor” could have some utility, despite the authors’ claim to the contrary that it has no interesting role to play in scientific theory. These kinds of contractions take place frequently in information compression, and are therefore meaningful in that context. It is not necessary to “stipulate” or endow them with any meaning over and above that context.
The authors elaborate on their solution to the analytic/synthetic distinction by introducing the notions of “analyticity*” and “T-analyticity.” It is here where the entire discussion can be summarized as a search for an algorithm to classify which statements are to be regarded as analytic* and when that is done to further segment the collection of analytic* statements that will assist in applying analyticity* to mathematics. This is readily apparent in their introduction of a “coordinate rule” for stipulation sentences for example. This move is very reminiscent of what is done in certain areas of artificial intelligence, particularly those that engage in representing common sense reasoning and language processing.
In defining analytic* statements it is not clear, at least for the reviewer, what the authors mean by “empirically indefeasible” in this discussion (and in other parts of the book). An elaboration of the meaning of this phrase seems warranted. Along these same lines the authors also make the astounding claim that mathematicians “typically ignore empirical data in their normal activity”. This claim is completely unsupported by any statistical sampling of the pool of mathematicians. There are scores of mathematicians, particularly those working in the fields of statistics and artificial intelligence, who routinely must deal with empirical data and revise their theories based on the nature and quality of this data. Philosophers of mathematics and philosophers of science should take time off and actually work in laboratories, think tanks, or applied research centers before they theorize about how mathematicians and scientists actually proceed in practice.
The authors give a fairly convincing case in how using the notion of analyticity* can be used to counter some of the objections to analyticity, but after studying carefully the overall discussion in the last chapter it was difficult for the reviewer to grasp the actual relevance of it for the area of mathematics. The last paragraph of the chapter attempts to offer some value for what they have done in the context of the goal of obtaining “intelligible schemes” for guiding our practices. No explicit examples are given however of how a certain area of mathematics or indeed any other quantitative field of endeavor would benefit from the notions developed in this book, interesting as they are. One field that immediately comes to mind is that of ‘anomaly detection’ in machine learning, wherein a gargantuan effort is spent on finding “novel possibilities” and “unforeseen patterns” that the authors refer to in the last sentence of the book. Those working in this field will certainly agree with the authors of the desirability for intelligent guidance using these possibilities and patterns.
0 of 0 people found the following review helpful.
A Good Intro to Analyticity
By moses88
Analyticity is an important concept in philosophy. Analytic statements are true in virtue of meaning. The following statements are considered as analytic:
All unmarried men are men.
All bachelors are men.
A or Not-A
We can also consider analytic reasonings. The examples are as follows:
Jeff Bezos is a bulls*** trash. Therefore, Jeff Bezos is a bulls*** trash.
I beheaded the CEO at Amazon.com Incorporated. Therefore, I beheaded the CEO at Amazon.com Incorporated or I beheaded the CEO at Amazon.com Incorporated.
They are valid in virtue of meaning, i.e. their logical structures. This book helps you understand 'true in virtue of meaning'.
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